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 Regulatory Reform of Japan's Electric Power Industry: 
Economies of Scale-and-Scope and Yardstick Competition 
Abstract: 
This paper utilizes the fixed-effect model of the panel-data analysis and estimates the translog 
cost function of the Japanese electric power industry from 1978 to 1998. First, we 
investigate whether the Japanese electric power industry has been naturally monopolistic or 
not. We find that all electric power companies still benefit from both scale and scope 
economies and therefore this industry remains a natural monopoly where we cannot expect a 
competition will automatically function. Second, in order to apply the idea of yardstick-type 
competition even to the naturally monopolistic industry where costs are quite different 
between companies, we introduce two kinds of cost-comparison coefficients for the 
individually specific effect and the scale-and-scope economies respectively. 
Keywords: 




A wave of liberalization is sweeping in the Japanese electric power industry that was 
previously a monopolistic industry. The entry regulation of power generation was abolished 
and a bidding system for the wholesale acquisition of electric power was introduced in 1995. 
Furthermore, the partial liberalization of the retail section started for the large-volume users 
from 2000. At this point, it will be necessary to examine the meaning of "monopoly" before 
arguing whether liberalization brings about an improvement in industrial efficiency. There 
are two types of monopoly: legal monopoly and natural monopoly. Even if legal monopoly 
is abolished, in the case where the industrial structure still remains naturally monopolistic, the 
economic significance of liberalization will be limited. In this sense, such a mechanism 
design as yardstick competition, which was introduced to some extent to the Japanese electric 
industry in 1995, is required so that electric power companies endeavor to manage more 
efficiency. 
This paper will investigate the cost structure of Japan's nine incumbent power companies 
(except the Okinawa Electric Power) over the past 20 years by using the translog cost 
function which is the most widely used flexible function in the cost estimation of public 
utilities. At the same time, we will adopt the fixed-effect model of panel data analysis, 
utilize the information about the individually specific effects of electric power companies, and 
measure the cost-comparison coefficients'. The contribution this paper seeks to make is not 
only to verify whether the natural monopoly of the Japanese electric power industry still
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remains but also to measure the cost-comparison coefficients so that a more refined incentive 
regulation for improving efficiency will be introduced even to an industry where we can not 
expect effective competition because of its strong natural monopoly2. 
There are two main' conclusions in this paper. Firstly, when the verification of the 
economies of scale-and-scope is carried out in the Japanese lectric power industry, it is 
clearly observed that he economies of scale-and-scope are widespread. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the Japanese electric power industry is still an industry of naturally 
monopolistic character. (For all that, it does not necessarily mean that the classical public 
utilities regulation is valid.) Secondly, we measure the cost-comparison coefficients from 
two different viewpoints: the economies of scale-and-scope and the individually specific 
effect. A cost-comparison coefficient ismultiplied by the individual average cost of a power 
company, and the adjusted average costs obtained in this way can be compared, and 
accordingly we can introduce a refined yardstick competition i to the industry where the 
assumption of equality of average costs among companies i seldom satisfied. In addition, 
we can expect acontribution to policy-making in universal service support that advocates fair 
supply of service in the whole country since the difference in the average cost between areas 
is explicitly calculated. 
The paper consists of the following nine sections. Section II surveys the history of the 
Japanese electric power industry and Section III introduces' definitions of variables and a 
method of estimating the cost function. - Section 'IV provides the definition of economies of 
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scale-and-scope, while Section V carries the result of the test of economies of scale-and-scope. 
The paper further develops its theme by presenting in Section VI definitions of cost-
comparison coefficients, with Section VII carrying. the result of the measurement of cost-
comparison coefficients. Section VIII examines the implications for policy discussion. 
Section IX draws a final conclusion. 
II. A Historical Overview of the Japanese Electric Power Industry 
It will be informative, before moving to the main subject, to provide abrief overview of the 
liberalization in the Japanese electric power industry. In May 1951, asystem was set up that 
divided the nation into nine areas with a single company to generate, transmit and deliver 
power in each area3. Before that, power generation and transmission had been consolidated 
in the Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company during the war, with nine local 
distribution companies handing power distribution, all of which were under government 
control. In1964, Japan promulgated the Electric Utility Industry Law with the objective of 
deregulating the industry, improving efficiency in the private sector, and simplifying and 
rationalizing the government's policy on electric power. Figure 1 geographically displays 
Japan's nine incumbent electric power companies. 
      <Figure 1> 
Untouched for 31 years, the Electric Utility Industry Law was extensively amended in April 
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1995 with particular focus on lifting. restrictions on who could participate in-the wholesale 
power generation market and instituting an across-the-board review -,o f safety:: regulations. 
Those amendments were enacted in December that same year. Some of the major changes 
included the introduction. of a supply bidding system from power wholesalers, the activation 
of wholesale transferable supply, and the creation of a new type of power provider.: In terms 
of cost, a yardstick assessment and control system were introduced. In 1996, six power 
companies accepted -supply bids. from power wholesalers: The competitive rate was 4.1 
times. Seven companies accepted bids in 1997, while only one did so in 1998. In May 
1997, the Cabinet adopted an Action Plan on Economic Structural Reform and Creation that 
aimed for "internationally competitive electricity, rates by the. year 200-F... In July that year, a 
Basic Policy Committee was set -up in, .the Electric. Utility. Industry. Council to make a 
complete review of Japan's power. supply system. In January. 1999, the Basic Policy 
Committee released a report hat called for partial iberalization i -the power retail market. 
It was directed at high demand power users that require .2000 kW or more of 20,000. V or 
-higher voltage supply. In February that year, the cabinet proposed revisions to the Electric 
Utility Industry Law based on this report. The. revisions were passed into law in, May that 
same year. The revisions , went as far as designing rules on network use, enactment of final 
guarantee covenant and determining consignment rates. In March 2000, a revised Electric 
Utility Industry Law was enacted. Tokyo, Kansai and Hokuriku Electric Power companies 
submitted a new rate menu for unregulated areas in anticipation of broader.liberalization n 
the future. In June, Mitsubishi Corporation subsidiary Diamond Power applied for approval 
as a power producer and supplier (PPS) in the power ;retail- market:. In August, the Ministry
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of International Trade and Industry accepted bids from power providers to supply their needs 
and Diamond Power won in the first case ever of a winning bid being tendered by a new 
entrant to the. retail market.
A study of partial iberalization i  the power retail market and a review of existing systems 
with the objective of expanding liberalization are planned for 2003. To sum up, since 
Japan's regulatory reform tends to be very slow and built on compromise, a radical remedy, 
including functional or structural unbundling or the promotion of convergence b tween the 
electric power industry and gas industry, will be required. 
III. The Definitions of Variables and the Estimation of Translog Cost 
Function
i
This section provides definitions and sets out a method to be used. We assume in this paper 
that there are two kinds of outputs in the electric power industry, the power generation (Y1) 
and the power transmission-and-distribution (Y2),and there are three kinds of production 
inputs, labor force (L), fuel (F), and capital (K)4. The definitions of variables are given as 
follows. (Note: each variable is normalized by its mean.) 
Outputs: 
    Generation; Y,_Mthe generated output - the station-use. electricity, 
   Transmission-and-distribution; Y2 $ ([E(the middle value of the voltage spectrum x the 
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       route length of transmission li es)] xthe number of contracts/customers)'/2. 
Inputs and their expenses 5: 
   Labor-input cost; PL a (the total personnel xpenses - the expenses of consignment meter-
       reading and consignment payment collection) / the number of regular employees at 
       the end of the fiscal year, 
   Fuel-input cost; PF a (the total fuel expenses for steam, internal combustion engine and 
       nuclear power generation) / the heat consumption fconversion i to heavy oil, 
   Capital stock; Kt w (1-b)(Kt_, - LAND,) + It + LAND,, 
       Note: btEthe depreciation expenses at t / the equipment expenses at the end of t-1, 
       LAND, athe land values at t = LAND,_, + ALAND, I,InK, - Kt-1 - ALANDt + 
       depreciation expenses att. 
   Capital cost; PK w [WPI(r,+b)(1-u,z)] I (1-u,), 
       Note: WPI E the price indexes of investment goods, r, a the interest payments at t / 
       (the corporate bond + the long-term loan at the beginning of t-1), ut m the 
       corporation-tax rate, zt E the ratio of the present value of the deduction of 
       depreciation expenses tothat of capital goods. 
The other definition: 
   Capacity utilization rate of power plants; CU mthe generated output / the installed 
       generating capacity. 
The terms, a, b, c, d, e, and f, are coefficients to be estimated. The long-term translog cost 
function, all of whose inputs we assume here are variable, can be defined as follows, taking
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a
.the symmetry of coefficients into consideration: 
   lnC(PL,PF,PK,Y1,Y2,t,CU) _ 
    a;+bL1nPL+bF1nPF+bKlnPK+(1/2)bLL(1nPL)2+(1/2)bFF(1nPF)2+(1/2)bKK(1nPK)2 
     +bLF1nPL1nPF+bLK1nPL1nPK+bFxlnPFlnPK+cllnYl+c2lnY2+(1/2)cll(lnYl)2 
     +(1/2)c22(lnY2)2+c12lnYllnY2+dLllnPL1nY1+dL2lnPLlnY2+dFllnPFlnY1 
      +dF2lnPF1nY2+dK11nPK1nY1+dK2lnPKlnY2+2:t=1.,_2leu1nPLDLt+X t=1...21eFilnPFDFt 
     +2:t--l ...2leKilnPKDKt+flt+f2t2+fCUlnCU. (1) 
It is noted that D;t for i=L, F, K represents he dummy variable of inputs costs while a; for 
i=1...9, represents the constant term of each power company. Since the fixed effect model is 
used here with the panel data of nine power companies from 1978 to 1998, the estimated 
coefficient a; represents what is called "individually specific effect" of each power company. 
In addition, the following constraints of linear homogeneity s imposed in advance on the cost 
function given above: 
    bL+bF+bK=1, bLL+bLF+bLK=O, bFF+bFL+bFK=O, bKK+bLK+bFK=O, dLl+ dFl+ dKi--O, 
    dL2+ dF2+ dK2=O, eU+eFt+eKt=O. (2) 
From the Shepherd lemma, the share quations of inputs are obtained as follows : 
    SL=bL+bLL1nPL+ bLF1nPF+bLK1nPK+ dLllnY1+ dL2lnY2+ l...2leLtDLt, 
    SF=bF+bFF1nPF+ bL 1nPL+bFK1nPK+ dF1lnY1+ dF2lnY2+2:t=1.._21eRDFt, 
   SK=bK+bKK1nPK+ bLK1nPF+bFK1nPF+ dK1lnY1+'dK2lnY2+1:t=l...2leKtDKt. (3) 
(Note: since the sum of three share quations must be one, one of them can be dropped.) 
We can now estimate he simultaneous equations of the long-term translog cost function and
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the share equations except the capital one by Zellner's seemingly unrelated regressions model 
(SUR). Table 1 indicates the main result of the estimation'. The result of the estimation 
appears to be fairly good8.
<Table 1>
IV. The Definition of the Economies of Scale-and-scope 
Due to, the characteristic known as ` bottleneck' or `essential facility' that arises from the huge 
plants and equipments ofpower generation, transmission, and distribution, the electric power 
industry has conventionally been considered to be naturally monopolistic. Natural 
monopoly is defined by the subadditivities of cost. As is well known, the necessary and 
sufficient condition that the subadditivities of cost equal to the economies of scale-and-scope 
does not exist in a case of multi-goods9. However, it is the sufficient condition of being a 
natural monopoly that the economies of scale exist in each good and the- economies of scope 
hold. Although there are various , kinds. of index for the economies of scale-and-scope, the 
following are used in this paper". 
   The index of overall economies of scale 
        01-[Y1(dC(Y1,Y2)/ aY1)+ Y2( 9C(Y1,Y2)/ tY2)l/C(Y1,Y2) (4) 
It is judged, here that if this figure is positive (negative), .the overall economies of scale (the 
diseconomies of scale) exist. Besides, the degree of scale economies becomes progressively 
smaller as. the figure is closer to 0, while the former becomes larger. as the latter is closer to 1. 
                                        -g-
   The economies of scale of each good i 01- 9lnC(Y1,Y2)/ alnYi (5) 
If this figure is positive (negative), the economies of scale of each good i (the'diseconomies of
scale) exist. Again, the degree of scale economies becomes progressively smaller as the 
figure is closer to 0, whereas the former becomes larger as the latter is closer to 1. 
   The economies of scope a a2C(Y1,Y2)/( aY1 9Y2) (6) 
If this figure is negative (positive), the economies of scope (the diseconomies of scope) exist 
between two goods". 
V. The Result of the Verification of the Economies of Scale-and-Scope 
Table 2 indicates the result of the verification of the economies of scale-and-scope at the point 
where the figures are mean values. The following can be observed here: since the 
economies of scale, overall or product specific, are all positive, this proves that the economies 
of scale exist on average; and since the economies of scope are negative, this shows that the 
economies of scope exist on average. All these results are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
     <Table 2> 
Let us discuss more fully the observations above. We will divide the whole period into four 
sub-periods: 1978-83, 1984-88, 1989-93, and 1994-98. Table 3 indicates the result of the 
verification of the economies of scale-and-scope of each electric power company during each 
                                                -10-
period; Figure 2 displays the index of each company on average in the period 1978-98. To 
begin with, several points can be made concerning the economies of scale as follows: 
(1) Based on the index of scale economies, on the whole, we can classify, electric power 
  companies into three groups: the first is one that has historically benefited considerably 
  from scale economies such as Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai operating in the three largest 
  metropolitan areas, namely Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka (as for the average (1978-98) 
   overall-scale-economies, these figures are 0.3242, 0.4349, and 0.3928, respectively); the 
   next is made up of one whose scale economies are intermediate such as Hokkaido, 
   Chugoku, and Kyushu operating in the urban areas, like Sapporo, Hiroshima, and 
  Fukuoka (these figures are 0.5565, 0.5141, and 0.5253, respectively); and the last is one 
   that has failed to make the most of scale economies such as. Tohoku, Hokuriku, and 
   Shikoku operating in rural areas (these. figures are 0.6341, 0.6477, and 0.6108, 
   respectively)". Although Tokyo Electric Power is by far and away the largest company 
   in Japan, it can be even now receiving benefits from the economies of scale. 
(2) It is reasonable to conclude that the economies of scale appear to be fairly steady in the 
   long run (as for the national average overall-scale-economies, these figures are 0.5064 
  (1978-83), 0.5107 (1984-88), 0.5215 (1989-93), and 0.5238 (1994-98)); however, that of 
   power generation rose once in the 1980s but fell afterwards (as for the national average 
   product specific scale economies of Y1, these figures are 0.5940 (1978-83), 0.6204 (1984-
   88), 0.6043 (1989-93), and 0.5931 (.1994-98)), while that of transmission-and-distribution 
   fell once in the 1980s but rose afterwards (as for the national average product-specific 
   scale economies of Y2, these figures are 0.8924 (1978-83), 0.8691 (1984-88), 0.8884 
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t
t
r  (1989-93), and 0.8970 (1994-98)). 
(3) The scale economies of transmission-and-distribution are clearly larger than that of power 
   generation (as for the national average (1978-98) product-specific-scale-economies, these 
  figures are 0.6029 for Y1 and 0.8867 for Y2). This indicates that the characteristics of 
  bottleneck or essential facility are stronger in the transmission-and-distribution section 
  than in the power-generation section. 
     <Table 3> 
      <Figure 2> 
Next, a few points will be, made concerning the economies of scope as follows: 
(1) Based on the index of scope economies, on the whole, we can classify electric power 
  companies into three groups: the first that has benefited from scope economies such as 
  Tokyo and Kansai (as for the average (1978-98) scope-economies, these figures are 
  -0.0501 and -0.0891, respectively); the next is made up of one whose scope economies 
  are intermediate such as Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Chugoku, Kyusyu (as for the average 
   (1978-98) scope-economies, these figures are -0.3265,.70.1632, -0.1421, -0.2-732, and 
  -0.1927, respectively); the last that has failed to make the most of scope conomies such 
  as Hokuriku, Shikoku (as for the average (1978-98) scope-economies, these figures are 
  0.8920 and -0.6050, respectively). 
(2) Even the largest electric power, company, Tokyo Electric Power, is still enjoying benefits 
  from the economies of scope. It is observed, however, that he economies of scope tend 
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  to fall in the long run (as for the national average scope-economies, these figures are 
  -0.3.828 (1978-83), -0.3379 (1984-88), -0.2722 (1989-93), and -0.2172 (1994-98)). 
It should be concluded from what has been said above that since both the economies of scale 
in each good and the economies of scope exist, the Japanese electric power industry is still 
naturally monopolistic even today. Even if an industry is naturally monopolistic, it may not 
put up barriers to entry and exit in a contestable market. However, we cannot suppose that 
the Japanese electric power industry is highly contestable because contestability requires strict 
conditions, such as no existence of sunk cost and the symmetry of demand and cost 
environments between an incumbent and an entrant. Therefore, it cannot be expected that 
the efficiency of resource allocation will be realized automatically only by abolishing the 
legal monopoly of Japan's electric power company. 
VI. The Definition of .Cost-comparison Coefficients 
It is in this section that a yardstick-type incentive regulation with cost-comparison coefficients 
will be discussed. This policy aims to introduce more competition even in the naturally 
monopolistic and _uncontestable industry where we cannot expect the. intense competition is 
particularly effective. It is sometimes pointed out that the yardstick-type comparison of 
business performance provides strong incentives to executive officers for improving 
management efficiency.. However, as is well known, the yardstick competition would not be 
effective without the symmetry of costs- among firms. Therefore, it is necessary in the 
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eassessment of yardstick-type that respective cost is multiplied by the cost-comparison 
coefficient and in this way the cost heterogeneity between companies is leveled so that a 
comparison can be made. We will show how to derive the cost-comparison c efficients with 
the fixed effect model of panel-data analysis nthe following section. 
The cost function estimated in Section 3 is broken down into the individually specific effect 
and the other common portion, and we call the latter a "standard cost function". If the cost 
function of the company j is defined as C,, the individually specific effect as KK, and the 
standard cost function as -co, then we obtain the next formula: CJ(Y1, Y2) =KK+co(Y1, Y2). Let 
us simply assume that j=A,B and KA=O. (Note: the company. A is set the Kyushu Electric 
Power in this paper.) Besides, ince the case of two goods is considered in this paper, the 
Euclid distance, [(Y1)2+(Y2}2]'f2, of the numerical value of outputs, Y=(Y1,Y2), are defined as 
the total output, IIYII, and the total cost of the company j divided by its total output, G(Y1,Y2) / 
IIYYII, is considered asthe average cost of the company j, A C313. It is from what has been 
discussed that he cost-comparison c efficients of company B in comparison with that of 
company A can be defined as follows. See also Figure 3. 
     <Figure 3> 
   The cost-comparison c efficients of company B of the individually specific effect": 
        AC,,(YB) co(YB)I iiY                      II (7)      a - 
ACB(YB} (KB +co(YB))l II YB II). 
   The cost-comparison c efficients of company B of the economies of scale-and-scope's: 
                                              -14-
     f_ACA(YA)'Co(YA)/IIYAII. (8)    AC
A(YB) CO (YB)/ II YB II 
   The overall cost-comparison coefficients of company16: 
     Y _ AC (RYA) _ co (Y' )/ II YA II ACA(YB) ACA(YA) _ ap. (9)         
B(YB) (KB +co(YB))l 11 YB II) ACB(YB) ACA(YB) 
VII. The Measurement Result of the Cost-Comparison Coefficients 
Having defined the cost-comparison coefficients, we will move on to the examination of the 
result. We will again divide the whole period into four sub-periods: 1978-83, 1984-88, 
1989-93, and 1994-98. Table 4 represents he result of the cost-comparison coefficients of 
the Japanese lectric power companies. Moreover, the cost-comparison coefficients of each 
electric power company on average in the period 1978-98 are plotted in Figure 4. It is 
noticeable that the higher the cost-comparison coefficient is the cheaper the :electricity 
production cost is, since the average costs of electric power companies are multiplied by the 
cost-comparison coefficients o carry out the yardstick-type assessment. 
      <Table 4> 
      <Figure 4> 
We can observe the following points: 
(1) The individual effect coefficients, a, and the scale-and-scope economy coefficients, f3, 
   tend to move in opposite directions, and the overall coefficients, y, remain relatively
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a  steady around 1., It may be that electric power companies are divided into three groups 
  according to a and P. In the large-company group such as Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai a 
  is lower than 1, representing the disadvantageous individual effect (these figures are 
  0.5835, 0.8582, and 0.7466, on average in the period 1978-98), while. P is higher than 1,-
  representing the advantageous scale-and-scope economies (these figures are 1.7292, 
  1.2395, and 1.4598, on average in the period 1978-98). In the group of medium-sized 
  companies uch as Tohoku, Chugoku, and Kyusyu both a and P are almost 1 (these 
  figures are 1.0940/1.0319,1.,1697/0.8866, and 1.000/ 1.000, on average in the period 1978-
  98). In the. group of small companies such as Hokkaido, Hokuriku, and Shikoku a is 
  higher than 1, representing the advantageous individual effect (these figures are 1.6517, 
  1.9293, . and 1.6937, on average in the period 1978-98), while 3 is lower than. 1, 
  representing the disadvantageous scale-and-scope economies (these figures are 0.8182, 
  0.5258, and 0.6548, on average in the period 1978-98). 
(2) Comparing= the adjusted average costs between companies that are multiplied by the 
  overall cost-comparison coefficients, .y, we can carry out the yardstick-type assessment of 
  the Japanese lectric power industries. In the case of y>1, the average cost before 
  adjustment is thought o be lower; on the other hand, in the case of y<1, the average cost 
  before adjustment is thought to be higher. When the cost-comparison coefficients in the 
  period 1994-98 are, taken as examples based on Kyushu Electric Power, the average costs 
  of Hokkaido will. be compared by the increase. of 40.2%, Tohoku by. the increase of 14.4%, 
  Tokyo by- the decrease of 0.3%, . Chubu by the increase of 5.1 %, Hokuriku by the increase 
  of 0.2%, Kansai by the increase of 8.8%, Chugoku by the increase of 1.7%, Shikoku by 
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  the increase of 10.71W'. However, as the numerical values of overall coefficients, y, 
  seem to fluctuate year by year, a frequent revision of the assessment will be desirable. 
VIII. Some Policy Discussions 
In this section, we will discuss some implications for the policy, based on the empirical 
foundations obtained so far. First, this paper made it clear in section V that the Japanese 
electric power industry has always been aturally monopolistic. This tendency is stronger 
than in the transmission-and-distribution section than in the power generation section. 
Therefore, if we leave this industry without any scheme, we cannot expect that its efficiency 
will automatically improve so much. Even so, we are opposed to the traditional idea that we 
should publicly regulate the electric power industry as strictly as before. On the contrary, we 
support the modem idea that a regulatory reform should be carried out in order to give 
incentives forefficient managements ven to a naturally monopolistic industry.. There are a 
gradual way and a radical way of moving towards regulatory reform. The gradual method is 
to introduce anindirect or partial competition nto the electric power industry and then to 
enlarge the scope of competition little by little, given that he current industrial structure does 
not change in the short erm. An example of indirect competition is the comparative 
assessment of the de facto regional monopolies n order to give them incentives for .cost 
curtailment. Asanother xample, the partial introduction of competition s to promote n w 
entrants into an area, such as power generation, whose natural monopoly is relatively weak.
-17-
Such competitive policies have actually been adopted in Japan. To take one example, a
yardstick regulation was introduced into the charge examination of electric power and gas 
industries by the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, under the umbrella of the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry, in January 1996. Two kinds of assessments were made 
to compensate fairly the cost and demand conditions for every company as follows; (1) the 
individual assessment: the verification of the validity of cost of each company, and (2) the 
comparative assessment: the comparison of the level of cost and the rate of change of cost of 
each company. The conditions of cost and demand are judged to be good if the calculation 
of cost-comparison coefficients i high. According to the Agency of Natural Resources and 
Energy, by regressing six explanatory variables with actual costs, the cost-comparison 
coefficients were calculated as half of the difference of the estimated value and the actual 
result".
n
Next, this paper estimated the cost function of power companies and then calculated the cost-
comparison coefficients in a different way from that employed by the Agency of Natural 
Resources and Energy. Our coefficient must be more carefully refined than that used 
politically now in Japan's industrial policy because the latter is not based on any econometric 
procedure for estimating cost function. On the other hand, as competition progresses, the 
cost gap between various areas will become a social problem. Furthermore, it can be said 
that this paper revealed how much costs differed among electric power companies.
In order to analyze the determinants of the cost-comparison coefficients of electric power
-18-
companies in detail, let us here regress the cost-comparison coefficients with (1) the demand 
density (the amount of electric power demanded, MWh, per contract), (2) the power-supply 
percentage (the ratio of maximum output of thermal power and nuclear electric power), and 
(3) the labor productivity (the amount of selling electric power per one employee). The 
average value of each explanatory variable of the electric power companies is displayed in 
Table 5, and the result of estimation is shown in Table 6. It can be observed that a cost-
comparison coefficient is lower (that is, an average cost is higher), as the demand density is 
higher, as the percentage of power supply of thermal and nuclear electric power is higher, and 
as the labor productivity is lower.
<Table 5> 
<Table 6>
We acknowledge that both a short-term, gradually regulatory reform and a long-term, 
radically' regulatory reform are required in order to improve the Japanese electric power 
industry. For that, functional unbundling or even structural unbundling which some 
countries, including the U.K. and some American states, including California, adopted will be 
required in the foreseeable future. However, since structural reform takes time and is 




There are two incentive effects in yardstick competition using cost-comparison coefficients 
discussed in this paper. First, if yardstick competition is introduced into a naturally 
monopolistic industry where competition seldom works, the improvement of management 
efficiency can be expected. Second, since the cost-comparison coefficients are calculated 
not on the basis of observed costs but on the basis of estimated costs, the cost-comparison 
assessment becomes generous for a company whose observed cost is lower than its estimated 
cost, see AC,, in Figure 3, and stricter for a company whose observed cost is higher than its 
estimated cost, see ACOB in Figure 3; in this respect, the effort of expense curtailment in the 
past is effectively reflected in the assessment, and the incentive to promote efficiency exists 
for the future as well.
Since the aims of our research are, first, to draw the cost-comparison coefficients by using the 
fixed effect model of panel data analysis, and, second, to propose a useful policy guideline 
toward regulatory reform, we have not daringly adopted complicated econometric models 
which much previous research has developed. Therefore, it is a future subject o reconsider 
the technique of our model in respect of refinement of models. As sometimes tated in 
footnotes, the following refinements will be needed: (1) the adoption of three outputs model 
in which transmission and distribution are considered separately, as well as power generation, 
(2) the adoption of generalized translog cost function like the Box-Cox transformation, (3) the 
estimation of the short-term cost function given that capital is quasi-fixed input and the
-20-
verification of the existence of over-capitalization r under-capitalization, (4) 'the estimation 
of a cost function allowing for the regulatory bias and the various technical inefficiencies. 
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'There are two kinds of panel data analysis: the fixed effect model and the random effect model (see Hsiao 
1986, Baltagi 1996 for details). Which model should be adopted is dependent on the analytic purpose. 
On one hand, since the random effect model has the bias on its estimated value in the case where there is a 
correlation between constant term and explanatory variables, we have to verify the properness of using the 
random effect model. - On the other hand, the fixed effect model has faults in that an economic 
interpretation f individually specific effects is sometimes difficult or that the degree of freedom in 
estimation is diminished by the dummy variables. At this moment, if the multi-collinearity among 
variables cannot be avoided and if the economic interpretation f the individually specific effect is 
relatively easy, such as in the electric power industry, the fixed effect model seems to be more desirable 
than the random effect model. 
2 The preceding studies of natural monopoly in the Japanese lectric power industry can be briefly 
summarized as follows: it has been conventionally supposed that although Japan's electric power industry 
has exhibited the economies ofscale-and-scope, th  extent of this has gradually decreased (see Nakanishi 
and Ito 1987). On the other hand, several studies, taking the tendency of over-capitalization into 
consideration, have recently revealed that he economies ofscale would almost disappear inthe long-term 
(see Nemoto, et al. 1993, Watanabe and Kitamura 1997, Goto and Sueyoshi 1998 for example). For a 
general discussion about he Japanese network utilities, Toyama 2000 will be informative. 
s In 1972, the Okinawa Electric Power Co., Inc. (a public orporation) was launched following the return of 
Okinawa to Japan. The company was later privatized in 1988, bringing the total of electric power 
companies in Japan to ten. 
a The industrial structure of electric power should originally be divided into three outputs: generation
, 
transmission, and distribution. However, there is a strong correlation between transmission and 
distribution. As a result, the econometric problem of multi-collinearity will occur and adversely affected 
the estimates. For this reason, we here adopt the two-outputs model considering transmission a d 
distribution as one output. In addition to this, there seems no agreement concerning the definition of the 
output of transmission-and-distribution, and various definitions have been given so far. Although Gilsdorf 
(1994) defines the output of transmission-and-distribution as he product of them, the difference of this 
output among companies becomes too large because of the multiplying procedure. Therefore, we will 
define the output of transmission-and-distribution as the geometric mean of transmission a d distribution. 
s As deflator, we use the capital-goods price index reported in the Price Index Statistics of the Bank of 
Japan for capital, gross investment, and depreciation expenses, and the GDP deflator for others.
-24-
6 It is often said that the tendency of over-capitalization exists in the electric power industry and capital is 
not adjusted to the optimum level. Though not indicated here, we estimated the short-term cost function 
in the case where capital is considered as quasi-fixed input, besides the long-term cost function, and 
confirmed that the tendency of over-capitalization existed in the Japanese lectric power industry. 
' The estimated value of coefficients dropped from the constraint of linear homogeneity are the following: 
bK=0.456941, bLL =0.11048, b =0204157, bKK =0.2472703, dK1= 0.016975, dK2=0.000956. 
s We have to check ex post whether the monotonicity and concavity of input prices and the monotonicity of 
outputs are satisfied according to all samples. The possibility that the conditions mentioned above may 
not be satisfied in the case of extremely small values may bring into question the properness of the translog 
cost function. It is true that there are some cases where the monotonicity of output is not satisfied in our 
estimation. However, some research demonstrating that the adoption of translog cost function does not 
necessarily cause a serious problem is also known (see Wales 1977 for details). 
9 It may be suitable to use an expression called the economies of vertical integration rather than economies 
of scope since power generation and transmission-and-distribution ca be considered as a vertically 
continuous tage in the production of electric power. See Kaserman and Mayo (1991) concerning the 
more discussions of vertical economies. 
to See Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) concerning the more discussions of economies of scale-and-scope. 
it Originally, the economies of scope should be judged by whether or not the sum of each stand-alone cost 
exceeds the overall cost. However, since we cannot assume output=0 due to the intrinsic nature of 
translog cost function, we here substitute the weak complementarities of cost for the test of economies of 
scope. In fact, the weak complementarities are only a sufficient condition for the economies of scope. A 
device that adopts the generalized translog cost function, such as using the Box-Cox transformation, is also 
an idea so that output = 0 can be set. 
12 It should be noted that benefiting from the economies of scale does not necessarily concord with 
producing much output because the economies of scale are influenced by the difference in input prices of 
each company. And it is because the partial derivatives of outputs on the total cost are negative that the 
figures of Hokuriku and Shikoku sometimes exceed 1 in several years. In this respect, our estimation 
model may not be proper. However, the economies of scale still exist in such a case. 
13 We understand that such an artificial method of aggregation of units may be problematic. Instead of 
aggregation, we can adopt a method of calculating the cost-comparison coefficient respectively depending 
on each output. In the case where our result is discussed for an actual policy, the respective cost-





units such as sales so that they can be easily aggregated altogether. 
14 The average cost of company B for Output Y
B is ACA(YB). When the individually specific effect of firm 
B is not taken into consideration, amely KB=O, the average cost of company B for output YB is ACA(YB). 
is When the individually specific effect of firm B is not taken into co
nsideration, amely KB=O, the average 
cost of company B for Output YB is ACA(YB) and the average cost of company B for output YA is ACA(YA). 
16 The average cost of company B for output Y
B is ACA(YB). When the individually specific effect of firm 
B is not taken into consideration, amely KB=O, the average cost of company B for output YA is ACA(1A)-
17 This result is very different from the general belief that th
e cost per kWh of Hokkaido is much higher 
than those of others. One reason for this is that the output of transmission-and-distribution becomes very 
large especially in Hokkaido whose area is very large when we define output o include transmission-and-
distribution as well as generation. 
18 Six explanatory variables are the following: (1) the power consu
med per contract, (2) the ratio of 
metropolitan areas, (3) the ratio of consumer of electricity whose voltage is less than 6000 V, (4) the 
number of contracts divided by the service area, (5) the power consumed per power line, and (6) the 
maximum capacity of power generation of each company. However, it is sometimes pointed out that there 
is a multi-collinearity among six variables (see Koike 1999). 
19 Here we do not enter into the further discussion of unbundlin
g of the Japanese lectric power industry 
because we need to estimate the cost functions of both vertically integrated and non-integrated firms for 
this (see Kerkvliet 1991 for more details). Unfortunately, the history of the Japanese deregulation is not 
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Table3: The economies of scale and scope
1978-83 1984-88 1989-93 1994-98 Average
Hokkaido
Overall economies of scale 0.5608 0.5531 0.5566 0.5556 0.5565
Economies of scale of Y, 0.7102 0.7160 0.7034 0.7006 0.7075
Economies of scale of Y2 0.8506 0.8371 0.8532 0.8550 0.8490
Economies of scope -0 .4006 -0.3603 -0 .2999 -0 .2454 -0 .3265
Tohoku
Overall economies of scale 0.6325 0.6361 0.6301 0.6378 0.6341
Economies of scale of Y, 0.6609 0.6849 0.6789 0.6495 0.6686
Economies of scale of Y2 0.7915 0.7701 0.7786 0.8038 0.7860
Economies of scope -0 .2083 -0.1791 -0.1518 -0 .1137 -0.1632
Tokyo
Overall economies of scale 0.3251 0.3266 0.3244 0.3208 0.3242
Economies of scale of Y, 0.5357 0.5278 0.5094 0.5153 0.5220
Economies of scale of Y2 0.7894 0.7988 0.8150 0.8055 0.8022
Economies of scope -0 .0680 -0.0535 -0 .0432 -0 .0357 -0 .0501
Chubu
Overall economies of scale 0.4318 0.4351 0.4375 0.4354 0.4349
Economies of scale of Y, 0.5095 0.5148 0.5100 0.5184 0.5132
Economies of scale of Y2 0.9223 0.9203 0.9275 0.9170 0.9218
Economies of scope -0.1910 -0.1521 -0.1236 -0.1017 -0.1421
Hokuriku
Overall economies of scale 0.6343 0.6502 0.6528 0.6535 0.6477
Economies of scale of Y, 0.5754 0.6503 0.6163 0.5804 0.6056
Economies of scale of Y2 1.0589 0.9999 1.0365 1.0732 1.0421
Economies of scope -1.1017 -1.0381 -0.8140 -0.6141 -0.8920
Kansai
Overall economies of scale 0.3910 0.3908 0.3933 0.3962 0.3928
Economies of scale of Y, 0.5429 0.5457 0.5385 0.5423 0.5423
Economies of scale of YZ 0.8481 0.8451 0.8547 0.8540 0.8505
Economies of scope -0 .1103 -0 .0946 -0 .0793 -0.0721 -0 .0891
Chugoku
Overall economies of scale 0.5045 0.5158 0.5200 0.5159 0.5141
Economies of scale of Y, 0.6215 0.6946 0.6531 0.6407 0.6525
Economies of scale of Y2 0.8830 0.8212 0.8669 0.8753 0.8616
Economies of scope -0.3350 -0.3130 -0.2455 -0 .1992 -0.2732
Shikoku
Overall economies of scale 0.6069 0.6096 0.6160 0.6105 0.6108
Economies of scale of Y, 0.5645 0.5946 0.5928 0.5782 0.5825
Economies of scale of Y2 1.0424 1.0150 1.0232 1.0323 1.0282
Economies of scope -0 .7776 -0 .6379 -0 .5660 -0.4385 -0 .6050
Kyusyu
Overall economies of scale 0.4704 0.4791 0.5631 0.5887 0.5253
Economies of scale of Y, 0.6251 0.6551 0.6365 0.6122 0.6322
Economies of scale of Y2 0.8453 0.8141 0.8403 0.8574 0.8393
Economies of scope -0 .2527 -0 .2127 -0.1714 -0.1342 -0.1927
Average
Overall economies of scale 0.5064 0.5107 0.5215 0.5238 0.5156
Economies of scale of Y, 0.5940 0.6204 0.6043 0.5931 0.6029
Economies of scale of Y2 0.8924 0.8691 0.8884 0.8970 0.8867






Table 4: The cost-comparison coefficients
1978-83 1984-88 1989-93 1994-98 Average
Hokkaido
a(individual effect) 1.6517 1.6517 1.6517 1.6517 1.6517
0(scale-and-scope economies) 0.8593 0.8091 0.7559 0.8486 0.8182
y(comprehensive) 1.4194 1.3363 1.2486 1.4016 1.3515
Tohoku
a(individual effect) 1.0940 1.0940 1.0940 1.0940 1.0940
0(scale-and-scope economies) 1.0309 1.0555 0.9953 1.0459 1.0319
y(comprehensive) 1.1279 1.1547 1.0889 1.1442 1.1289
Tokyo
a(individual effect) 0.5835 0.5835 0.5835 0.5835 0.5835
0(scale-and-scope economies) 1.6606 1.7805 1.7674 1.7081 1.7292
y(comprehensive) 0.9690 1.0389 1.0313 0.9967 1.0090
Chubu
a(individual effect) 0.8582 0.8582 0.8582 0.8582 0.8582
f3(scale-and-scope economies) 1.1628 1.2956 1.2744 1.2251 1.2395
y(comprehensive) 0.9980 1.1119 1.0937 1.0515 1.0637
Hokuriku
a(individual effect) 1.9293 1.9293 1.9293 1.9293 1.9293
f(scale-and-scope economies) 0.5369 0.5164 0.5304 0.5194 0.5258
y(comprehensive) 1.0358 0.9964 1.0233 1.0021 1.0144
Kansai
a(individual effect) 0.7466 0.7466 0.7466 0.7466 0.7466
f(scale-and-scope economies) 1.4596 1.4727 1.4502 1.4567 1.4598
y(comprehensive) 1.0897 1.0995 1.0827 1.0875 1.0898
Chugoku
a(individual effect) 1.1697 1.1697 1.1697 1.1697 1.1697
0(scale-and-scope economies) 0.9097 0.8814 0.8862 0.8693 0.8866
y(comprehensive) 1.0640 1.0309 1.0365 1.0167 1.0371
Shikoku
a(individual effect) 1.6937 1.6937 1.6937 1.6937 1.6937
f5(scale-and-scope economies) 0.6493 0.6716 0.6451 0.6534 0.6548
y(comprehensive) 1.0997 1.1375 1.0926 1.1066 1.1091
Kyushu
a(individual effect) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
f(scale-and-scope economies) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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